LB462 伊津

(P.462 Para. 2 - P.462 Para. 1)


It comes about after reflexive body movements and entered man's consciousness, and after the association of perceptions with sounds. Language had not been adequatedly understood in the past, because it had been regarded solely as means of communication. It had been incorrectly assumed that man had images, thoughts and the additional ability to express these in terms of sounds. Images and thoughts were themselves based on language.

“We see now…how everything man attains at a higher level than animal consciousness and intuitions, is gained by way of language…Language is self-awareness, that is, understanding oneself… as one is understood by another. One understand oneself: that is the beginning of language”[92].
Steinthal’s work had a profound influence on the well-known internist and professor of medicine in Strasbourg, Adolf Kussmaul(1822-1902) who devoted the first fifteen chapters of his book ”On the Pathology of Language,” to define and describe languages as such. “Language may refer to the physical –mental act of the expression of thoughts, or to that which is expressed. To attempt the understanding of language as an act of expression, is the task of physiology and psychology. ”
His description of the development of language in children is remarkably perceptive: Children are born with a sense of language, an irresistible drive to express themselves. The babbling of infants is a spontaneous reflex activity, as are the uncoordinated movements of their limbs. As the child grows, it begins to listen, to differentiate sounds and to imitate words. This is not a simple process, some words the child understands without imitating them, others it imitates without understanding their meaning. In general terms, language development shows a gradual replacement of “the natural language of the child”(babbling), by the traditional language of the nation. As this is accomplished, language is removed from the spontaneous sphere and comes under the rule of will and habits. Full development of language is equivalent to expression of (conceptualized) thoughts. Once this as occurred, the child has acquired the ability to elaborate the object images connected with words into concepts [93].
Language poses a difficult problem in that it develops “without consciousness or purpose, although (later) we speak consciously and purposefully.” This need not surprise us, for most neural and mental activity is predominantly unconscious. Kussmaul thought that it would be premature to discuss language in purely physiological terms, as long as physiology was just beginning to decide on its experimental methods. It would be just as impossible to ascribe the complex function of language to simple speech center as to define a simple center of the soul [94]. 19Kussmaul’s work is remarkable for its psychological insight and its lucid elaborations on the nature of language and the problem it poses. He judged correctly the precocity of any physiological formulation and the futility of a simple hypothetical speech center where language could be localized.



[92] Steinthal, Heyman, Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft. Duemmler, Berlin, 1871, pp.42, 82-85, 369-370, 385-86

[94]Kussmaul, A., op. cit, pp.33, 110, 114, 127

LB393 伊津

(p.393 para. 3)

Recognition of syntactic patterns cannot be accomplished on basis of probability statistics (Chomsky and Miller, 1963; Chomsky 1963; Miller and Chomsky, 1963). The rules that underly syntax (which are the same for understanding and speaking) are of a very specific kind, and unless man or mechanical devices do their processing of incoming sentences in accordance with these rules, the logical, formal, analysis of the input will be deficient, resulting in incorrect or random responses. When we say rules must have been built into the grammatical analyzer, we impute the existence of an apparatus with specific structure properties or, in other words, a spectic internal organization.
In a certain sense all organisms are self-organizing systems. And, therefore, the question that faces us is, “What is the degree of freedom with which the specific organization necessary for language processing comes into being.” If the freedom were unlimited, the nature of man would unlimited in its capacities. This must be rejected for obvious reasons. There is no other organism with unlimited capacities and we no longer believe that man in different from other creatures in such fundamental ways. In fact, there is no possible way in which we could think of a device, natural or artificial, that is free from all structural limitations. At best we may assume that a certain mechanism has the capacity to organize itself in more than one way (that is, depending on certain conditions of input, it may eventually be operating in any one of a number of possible modes). This formulation makes it clear that in any case we must assume a biological matrix with specifiable characteristics that determines the outcome of any treatment to which the organism is subjected. Thus the search for innate properties is well within the scope biological inquiry.

Preface

Preface
Ideas do not grow in vacuo. Throughout my fifteen years of residence in the Cambridge area, I have greatly profited from courses taken and given, from conversations, and from general interaction with colleagues and students. I wish to mention particularly Georg v. Békésy, Roger Brown, Jerome Bruner, Noam Chomsky, George Gardner, George Miller, and Peter Wolff. All of them have discussed various aspects of this book with me, and most have read and commented upon several chapters or the entire manuscript. I am also indebted to Hans-Lukas Teuber for critically reading Chapters one and five; to A. H Schultz and George Erikson for advising me on Chapter two; to Philip Liberman and Arthur House for commenting on Chapter three; to M. Kinsbourne for reading chapter four; to Charles Gross and Peter Huttenlocher for criticisms of Chapter five; to H. Burla, Hans Kalmus, and Ernst Mayr for reading various versions of Chapter six; and to DeLee Lantz for comments and criticisms on Chapter eight.
想法並非憑空而來。住在劍橋的期間，上課與聽課時與同事和學生的交流，使我獲益良多。我要特別感謝Georg v. Békésy,Roger Brown, Jerome Bruner, Noam Chomsky, George Gardner, George Miller, 還有 Peter Wolff。 他們皆與我討論過書中的許多部份，大多數人曾評論或閱讀過好幾個章節或整個手稿。我也要感謝Hans-Lukas Teuber，謝謝他對第一章和第五章的批評指教; 還要感謝 A. H Schultz 和 George Erikson， 他們給了許多第二章的建議;感謝 Philip Liberman and Arthur House 評論了第三章; 感謝 M. Kinsbourne閱讀第四章; 感謝Charles Gross和 Peter Huttenlocher 對第五章的批評; 感謝H. Burla, Hans Kalmus和 Ernst Mayr 閱讀了第六章的各個版本;感謝 DeLee Lantz 對第八章的評論與批評。

Jerome Bruner

Jerome Seymour Bruner (born 1 October 1915) is an American psychologist who has contributed to cognitive psychology and cognitive learning theory in educational psychology and to the general philosophy of education. Bruner is currently a senior research fellow at the New York University School of Law. Bruner's ideas are based on categorization. "To perceive is to categorize, to conceptualize is to categorize, to learn is to form categories, to make decisions is to categorize." Bruner maintains people interpret the world in terms of its similarities and differences. Like Bloom's Taxonomy, Bruner suggests a system of coding in which people form a hierarchical arrangement of related categories. Each successively higher level of categories becomes more specific, echoing Benjamin Bloom's understanding of knowledge acquisition as well as the related idea of instructional scaffolding.
He has also suggested that there are two primary modes of thought: the narrative mode and the paradigmatic mode. In narrative thinking, the mind engages in sequential, action-oriented, detail-driven thought. In paradigmatic thinking, the mind transcends particularities to achieve systematic, categorical cognition. In the former case, thinking takes the form of stories and "gripping drama." In the latter, thinking is structured as propositions linked by logical operators.
In his research on the development of children (1966), Bruner proposed three modes of representation: enactive representation (action-based), iconic representation (image-based), and symbolic representation (language-based). Rather than neatly delineated stages, the modes of representation are integrated and only loosely sequential as they "translate" into each other. Symbolic representation remains the ultimate mode, for it "is clearly the most mysterious of the three." Bruner's theory suggests it is efficacious when faced with new material to follow a progression from enactive to iconic to symbolic representation; this holds true even for adult learners. A true instructional designer, Bruner's work also suggests that a learner (even of a very young age) is capable of learning any material so long as the instruction is organized appropriately, in sharp contrast to the beliefs of Piaget and other stage theorists. (Driscoll, Marcy). He received his B.A. in 1937 and his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1941 under the guidance of Gordon Allport.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jerome_Bruner


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